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Abstract: Fault diagnostics systems are incorporated to determine the health of the 
system they monitor.  There are however times when the diagnostics system reports 
faults which do not exist.  This situation commonly arises at system start-up when 
high vibration levels exist and the systems are not performing in the same way as 
when they are operational.  Unnecessary shutdowns can occur due to transient 
behaviour of the system.  On autonomous vehicles, such as Unmanned Aerial 
Vehicles (UAVs), information about the health of the system can be used to support 
the decision making process and to plan the future system operation.  When faults 
are reported on autonomous systems, where there is no pilot to interpret the 
conditions reported, a method is needed to establish whether the reported faults do 
exist.  Utilising a fault propagation modelling technique deviations in system 
variables can be propagated through the system until further evidence of fault 
presence is observed.  If some evidence that contradicts the fault presence is found, 
the fault can be cancelled and unnecessary shutdowns can be avoided.  
In this paper a propagation table method is developed to model fault propagation 
through a system.  The system is broken down into its constituent components and 
each model shows how process variables depend not only on the state of the 
component but also on the state of the entire system.  The outputs of the two-way 
fault propagation modelling are values of process variables at different locations in 
the system.  These values can be compared with the symptoms observed and used 
to cancel or confirm faults.  This comparison process is accomplished at each phase 
that the system goes through during its defined mission.  The illustration of the fault 
propagation methodology is given using an example system, and its application for 
the fault cancellation process is discussed. 
Keywords: Decision table, propagation table, fault propagation modelling, fault 
diagnostics. 
1. Introduction  
A fault can be defined as an abnormal state of a system, including malfunction of a 
part, an assembly or the whole system. When a fault occurs, knowing exactly which 
failure has occurred and caused observed symptoms allows the decision maker to 
be able to take an appropriate action and reduce consequences of failure. 
Understanding of symptoms and fault conditions supports the fault diagnostics 
process, which is essential for the safe operation of the system and maintenance 
planning. It is beneficial to have a model which takes the system status, indicated by 
sensors, and predicts possible component failures. There is a considerable interest 
of this capability for autonomous vehicles, when the fault diagnostics feeds directly 
into decision making for mission planning. A fault propagation model could also 
assist in an optimised sensor allocation strategy to maximise fault diagnosability.  
      During the start-up of the system, diagnosed fault conditions are added to a fault 
log or report, even when faults occur due to transient behaviour of the system, for 
example, during the start-up of a fuel pump. Depending on the nature of the faults 
they can result in system shutdown, especially when the system is operated 
autonomously and decisions are made according to the fault condition report. 
Therefore, unnecessary shutdowns of the system could be avoided, when false 
faults are cancelled after performing the fault propagation modelling. During such a 
process some means of system representation is needed to allow disturbances 
induced by faults to be propagated through the system. Introducing deviations in 
system variables and propagating them through the system could be used to confirm 
faults, if observations match the expected effects, or cancel faults, if symptoms 
contradict the expected effects.   
     In the last three decades many efficient tools have been used to model fault 
propagation. A number of causal models are used to capture the causal structure of 
the system and to reason from the qualitative knowledge within the models. The 
main techniques used in the literature are digraphs [1,2,3], decision tables [4] and 
fault trees [5,6,7,8]. In recent applications Petri nets are also used to model fault 
propagation [9].  
     This paper develops a propagation table method, when (1) no restriction is placed 
on the number of discrete states used to represent variable deviations, (2) a number 
of process variables can be modelled using a structure similar to a decision table, 
and (3) a number of different component failure modes can be considered in the 
model. Originally in [10] the decision tables described each possible output state as 
a complete set of combinations of inputs and internal operational or failed states. In 
the study [4] systems with control loops were modelled using the decision table 
method. Further developments on the fault propagation modelling using the decision 
tables were done in [11], when a super component concept was introduced to model 
sections of a complex diagram as a single component. In [12] failures were defined 
not only by qualitative descriptions in the tables, but also by quantitative event types, 
to describe different properties of components with different specifications. A 
combined decision table and diagraph method was presented in [13,14] to model 
control loops and circuits in the system. The hybrid approach was based on flexibility 
of the decision table method but also incorporated a way of analysing control loops, 
similar to that used in the digraph approach.  
     Tables, such as decision tables, are suitable for fault propagation modelling, 
because they describe cause and effect behaviour of the system under normal and 
failed conditions. The novelty of the propagation table method in this paper is that (1) 
all process variables are modelled in a single table, (2) component models are built 
considering not only the states of the component but also the state of the system 
downstream, and (3) failure effects are recorded not only for the output port but also 
for the input port of the component which enables a more realistic two-way fault 
propagation. A system is defined by a schematic diagram, which is decomposed into 
its constituent components for the modelling. A propagation table is built for each 
component and the fault propagation algorithm is used to obtain variable deviations 
in the system. The outcomes can be compared with the observed symptoms and the 
fault cancellation rules can be applied to confirm or cancel faults. The approach is 
presented in section 3 and its illustration using a simple system example is given in 
Section 4.The propagation table can also be used in fault diagnostics, as discussed 
in section 5. 
2. Overview of Fault Propagation Modelling Technique 
Fault propagation modelling shows how faults affect process variables and how their 
deviations distribute through the system. Such an approach can be useful in 
identifying failures which have caused the system deviations or propagate the 
deviations of process variables in the system. The latter capability is especially 
important in the fault cancellation process, which can solve the issue of reported 
faults which do not exist in reality. Such a situation can arise at system start-up, 
when due to high vibration levels the system performs differently than in the 
operational mode. For autonomous vehicles the issue becomes even more important 
when there is no pilot to interpret the health management reports and ignore false 
alarms. Therefore, a method to establish fault presence is needed.  
     Fault propagation modelling is performed using a novel fault propagation table 
method. There are four steps in the method:  
1. System decomposition 
2. Development of fault propagation tables 
3. Fault propagation algorithm for obtaining process variable values in the 
system  
4. Fault cancellation rule. 
     Figure 1 shows the basic approach of the technique. A system is modelled as a 
set of different types of components connected to each other. Each component is 
represented by a propagation table. The novelty of the method is the ability to 
perform two-way fault propagation modelling, which outputs values of process 
variables at different locations in the system. These values show how the system 
works in the operational mode and what the effects of component failures are. In the 
latter case variable values can be compared with the symptoms observed and a rule 
is introduced for cancelling or confirming faults. 
 
Figure 1: Structure of the Proposed Approach for Fault Propagation Modelling 
 
3. Fault Propagation Modelling Approach 
3.1 System Decomposition 
    In the component-based approach of system modelling the system is decomposed 
to its constituent components. Using this approach a schematic diagram is converted 
into a configuration diagram, where components are represented by rectangles, 
connected by directed links. Each rectangle contains the name of the component, its 
unique identification number on the left and the model number on the right. 
Components are numbered from left to right across the diagram, starting with the 
process flow and then considering control loops. Types of typical component models 
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in fluid systems are shown in Table 1. The model number is needed for the 
identification of the component propagation table during the fault propagation.  
     Rectangles in the configuration diagram are connected by directed links, where 
the arrows show the direction of the flow or the direction of the information passed 
around the system. A link is called a location, which has a unique identification 
number allocated to it. Locations are numbered in a similar manner to the 
components. In a tabular form of the system diagram each location is described by 
its upstream and downstream components and their ports, which are used during the 
fault propagation modelling in order to identify component models upstream and 
downstream the fault.  
     In addition to the schematic diagram some structural information about the 
system is also necessary, i.e., the information about flow loops, control loops, 
dividers and headers. The presence of these structures affects the general rules of 
the fault propagation algorithm. The necessary information can be described 
manually or generated automatically using the criteria, described in this section. Also, 
it is important to have the information about the flow capacity. In this paper pumps 
are assumed to work 100%, and if the flow at the input of the divider is 100%, then 
the flow at one output of the divider is also 100%, if the other output does not contain 
any flow. If both outputs allow the flow through, the capacity in each output is 50%.  
Table 1: Component Models 
Model 
no. 
Model 
description 
1 Engine 
2 Engine Control 
3 Level Control 
4 Level Sensor 
5 Pipe Single 
6 Pipe Divider 
7 Pump 
8 Pump Control 
9 Tank 
10 Valve 
11 Valve Control 
3.2 Component Propagation Tables 
In order to model the fault propagation each component is described by a 
propagation table. This method is suitable for fault propagation modelling, since the 
table is a type of causal model, when cause and effect behaviour of the system 
under normal and failed conditions is considered. The main advantage of the 
propagation table method is its flexibility in terms of entries in the table which is 
important for the efficient two-way fault propagation modelling technique.  
3.2.1  Process Variables and Assumptions 
     In order to describe component models and their building mechanism, consider 
the relevant process variables and modelling assumptions. For the schematic 
diagram four process variables are identified ± mass (M), mass flow (F), pressure (P) 
and level (L). Basic physic laws, governing mass, energy and momentum, are 
applied in component models. Flow is created by a pressure difference in the system 
and is modelled together with the pressure. Tank level is a function of flow in and out 
of the tank. The deviations of these parameters that appear in the tables are 
considered as follows:  
x Mass: present (Y), absent (N). 
x Flow/level: zero (Z), lower than expected (L), normal (N) and higher than 
expected (H).  
x Pressure: lower than expected (L), normal (N) and higher than expected (H).  
     Note that H and L are assumed to be simply high or low to cause a deviation, so 
QRGHJUHHVRI³KLJKQHVV´RU³ORZQHVV´DUHFRQVLGHUHGLQWKHPHWKRG 
     There are a number of control signals used in the component models, as shown 
in the models in section 4. For example, a signal to start a pump is defined as Ystart. If 
during the system operation the control signal stays the same, it is described as a 
lack of the signal to perform an opposite operation, for example, a lack of signal to 
shut the pump, Nshut. If the control signal changes to cause the opposite effect, it is 
described as a signal to perform an opposite action, for example, a signal to shut the 
pump, Yshut.  
     A number of modelling assumptions are set: 
x System pressure is higher than the atmospheric pressure outside the system 
x Flow through a pipe leak is smaller than flow in the system 
x There is no reverse flow in the system 
x The mass is absent if it cannot be maintained during the operation of the 
component 
x A component leakage creates local system effects only; therefore, fault effects 
are propagated to neighbouring components only.  
3.2.2  Propagation Table Structure 
     The propagation table method developed in this paper has a number of 
advantages from the previous applications of decision tables. First of all, instead of 
having a number of different tables for the same component but different variable, 
the method can accommodate deviations of mass, flow, pressure and level in the 
same table. Since these parameters are related through the laws of physics it is 
beneficial to store their deviations in one table. Secondly, the propagation table 
accommodates not only every component failure mode but also the state of other 
components downstream. For example, zero flow out of the pipe can be caused not 
only by the pipe blockage but also by other blockages downstream of the pipe. 
Finally, not only the outputs but also the inputs are affected by faults; therefore, each 
input and output is modelled in the table. These advantages of the new method are 
beneficial in performing two-way fault propagation in fluid systems.  
     There are four types of columns in the propagation table, which are described as 
follows:  
1. Inputs: A set of relevant process variables at all in ports, out ports and control 
signals, if appropriate, are considered in the input column. In order to reduce 
the table size the pressure and flow values are omitted from component 
models with a single in port. For the modelling it is assumed that these values 
are P and F for pressure and flow respectively.  
2. Component state: Working and failed states of the component are 
considered in this column. For example, in the pipe model working, leaking, 
ruptured or blocked states are considered. 
3. Conditions downstream: These conditions describe the state of the system 
downstream. The flow system can be working, blocked or ruptured.  
4. Outputs: These conditions are described by a set of relevant process 
variables at all in and out ports of the component, and control signals, if 
appropriate. For example, in the pipe model the mass, flow and pressure into 
the pipe and out of the pipe are considered.  
     Once component failure modes are chosen, the propagation table is filled taking 
into account relevant inputs, combining them with each state of the component and 
relevant conditions downstream and obtaining the outputs. For example, due to a 
pipe blockage or a blockage downstream, there is no flow into the pipe and out of the 
pipe, and pressure increases before the blockage, as shown in Table 2, rows 2 and 
4. Note that not every model has all columns; the presence depends on their 
relevance to the behaviour of the component, as seen in the component models in 
section 4. Finally, a reduction of the table is performed by introducing more general 
HQWULHVDQGXVLQJWKH³-´V\PERO7KH³-³QRWDWLRQLQGLFDWHVWKH³GRQ¶WFDUH´FRQGLWLRQ
of the entry, which means that a specified set of entries in a row will occur regardless 
of the entry. For example, if the pipe is blocked there will be the same effects 
regardless of the conditions downstream. 
Table 2: A Propagation Table for a Pipe 
No 
Inputs Component 
state 
Conditions 
downstream 
Outputs 
M Pin Fin Min Pout Fout Mout 
1 Y W W P1 F Y P2 F Y 
2 Y W B 3 Z Y 3 Z Y 
3 Y W R 3 ) Y 3 ) Y 
4 Y B - 3 Z Y 3 Z N 
5 Y R - 3 ) Y 3 Z N 
6 Y L W 3 ) Y 3 ) Y 
7 Y L B 3 ) Y 3 Z Y 
8 Y L R 3 ) Y 3 ) Y 
9 N - - 3 Z N 3 Z N 
3.2.3 Formalization of the System Operation 
     A table with expected component states during the normal behaviour of the 
system in each phase is built, which is used to decide whether the component state 
is faulty or working. For example, if an engine feed valve is controlled to be closed in 
phase I and open in phase II, the valve failure closed in phase I does not affect the 
normal system behaviour, since the valve is expected to be closed in phase I. Fault 
effects become important in phase II, when the valve is controlled to open, therefore, 
the fault propagation modelling is performed in phase II.  
     As it was mentioned in the step of system decomposition, there are situations 
when the general rules of modelling are not sufficient to describe the algorithm and 
some structural information about the system is needed. The following definitions are 
used in the modelling algorithm to formalise the structural information of the system:  
1. Flow loop. A loop is a part of the system when the trace in the direction of the 
flow passes over the same component twice. Loops appear due to alternative 
lines of flow in the system. They can be obtained manually or using a simple 
tracing algorithm.  
2. Control loops. A control loop usually has a sensor, a controller and a valve. 
In this paper a feedback control system is modelled, when the sensor 
monitors the output, feeds the data to the controller which continuously 
adjusts the control input. For example, a feedback tank level control loop 
consists of the level sensor which monitors the level, the level controller, 
which adjusts the operation of the pump to obtain appropriate flow from the 
tank, and the pump, which has similar effects to those of a valve. The 
configuration of the loop is given by a set of locations in the direction of the 
information flow which can be obtained manually or using an algorithm of the 
control loop definition.  
3. Pipe divider. A pipe divider has a single input and a number of outputs, which 
are given by a set of locations starting with a single in port and two out ports.  
4. Pipe header. A pipe header has a number of inputs and a single output, 
which is given by a set of locations in a similar manner to the pipe divider.  
5. Gap components. In schematic diagrams there are components that break 
the continuity of flow. This happens when the component has a capacitance 
effect, for example, a tank. Also, dividers and headers are called gap 
components, since multiple inputs or outputs also disturb the continuity of 
flow.  
3.2.4  Modelling Algorithm 
     The purpose of the fault propagation modelling is to record values of process 
variables at each location in the system. These values are obtained from relevant 
rows in the component models. The process starts at a set location, recording the 
parameter values in and out of the component from the output column in the model. 
Then these values are passed to the component models downstream and upstream 
the system to record parameter values at other locations. The function, shown in the 
flowchart in Figure 2, recursively calls itself until all the locations are visited and 
parameter values are recorded. 
 
     There are four main steps in the algorithm: 
1. Start the modelling at a set location 
2. Propagate downstream the system, incorporating control loops, flow loops 
and dividers 
3. Propagate upstream the system, incorporating control loops, flow loops and 
dividers 
4. Calculate tank level.  
     The modelling is performed for each phase of the system operation, and faults 
and their effects are carried over from one phase to another. For example, if the tank 
is leaking in phase I and the level drops to low, at the beginning of phase II the tank 
level is also low. Also, if the failure mode does not violate the expected state of the 
component, the system is operating normally, even when a fault has occurred. 
However, the failure mode can cause failure effects in the future phases.   
3.2.4.1 Start of the Modelling Process  
     The modelling process starts at a set location in the system. The set location is 
the source of the system material. Since the scope of this paper is fluid systems, 
control signals are related with the flow in the system and its control, and the source 
of fluid is a tank. The flow is present in the system if a relevant pump is working and 
the relevant valves are open. Therefore, in fluid systems the modelling starts 
initiating the flow out of the tank in the part of the system with a working pump and 
an open valve. When a fault occurs, the set location for the start of the process is the 
failed component. 
     The propagation table of the component at the set location is identified according 
to the model number in Table 1 and the component model. A row that corresponds 
to the component state, appropriate input values, control signal and working 
conditions downstream are considered. Parameter values from the output column in 
that row are recorded at the locations of in and out ports of the component.  
3.2.4.2 Propagation Downstream the System 
     Parameter values at the out port location of the component become the values at 
the in port of the component downstream and are used to find a suitable row in the 
model. Following exceptions are made:  
x If the component is a part of the flow loop, each component downstream is 
considered until the start of the loop is reached. This is also the case for the 
control loop. In addition to reaching the end of the loop, the modelling of the 
output, i.e., the control signal, is also performed.  
x If the component is a divider, the out ports are considered one-by-one. In 
order to choose an appropriate row in the divider model, the line is considered 
in the open state, if a valve on the line is open and there are no obstacles for 
the flow. If the valve is closed or there are some other obstacles for the flow, 
the line is considered blocked.  
     The process continues until the end of the system, the end of the loop or a gap 
unit is reached. 
 
Figure 2: The Flowchart of the Algorithm   
3.2.4.3 Propagation Upstream the System 
     Considering the component upstream, parameter values at the location of the in 
port to the component are recorded. During this step of the algorithm the state of the 
failed component becomes the state of conditions downstream. A list of fault 
categories is shown Table 3, where faults which cause the same effects are in the 
same category. 
     Note, that a leakage is considered in the category of working states, since the 
assumption was made to consider the local effects of the leakage only. Also, the 
pump failure off/Non does not fit in any category of faults. This fault results in the 
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absence of the mass and the parameter values are propagated through the system. 
Following exceptions are made: 
x If the component is a part of the flow loop, each component upstream is 
considered until the start of the loop is reached. If the component is a part of 
the control loop, no upstream propagation is performed, since only one way 
propagation, i.e., downstream of the component, is possible in the component 
models of the control loop. Changes in the tank level are calculated in Step 4.  
x If the component is a divider, all the out ports are considered first before going 
upstream to the in port. Some out ports might need to be revisited, if 
parameter values are affected by the divider model. Also, for components 
upstream the divider, the value of conditions downstream might change from 
a blockage to working conditions, for example, if a blockage can be rectified 
using a reconfiguration option, as described in the example system in section 
4.  
     The process continues until the start of the system, the start of the loop or a gap 
unit is reached.  
Table 3: Categories of Component Faults 
No Fault Category 
1 Pipe/tank blockage Blockage 
2 Pipe/tank rupture Rupture 
3 Pipe/tank leak Working 
4 Valve fails open/Nclose  Fails open 
5 Valve fails closed/Nopen  Blockage 
6 Engine fails off /Non  Blockage 
3.2.4.4 Tank Level Calculation  
The tank level is calculated once all the locations downstream the tank are visited. It 
is calculated as a sum of all the positive flows in and of all the negative flows out:  
¦¦  
i
out
i
ininit FFLevelLevel  (1) 
     Initially the level in the tank is normal, i.e., Levelinit = N. If ¦
i
inF  exceeds¦
i
outF , 
the level is high, if ¦
i
outF  exceeds ¦
i
inF the level is low, otherwise, the level is 
normal. 
     If the level is controlled, the value of the tank level is passed to the control loop. If 
the value of the tank level changes, it is sent to the control loop and the process 
continues until all the relevant level deviations are considered, as shown in Figure 2.  
The steps of the algorithm are applied until all the locations are visited.  
3.2.5  Multiple Fault Propagation Case 
    The previously described algorithm considers the single fault propagation process 
only. However, it can be carried over to the multiple fault propagation case. Multiple 
faults are considered in the order that they occur during the operation. If they occur 
at the same time, a logical approach is to consider them in the order that 
components are positioned in the system in the direction of flow. If one of the faults 
is a pump failure off, this fault is considered first, even if there are some faults 
upstream the pump. This is due to the fact that the pump failure terminates the flow 
in the system and effects of other failures do not need to be modelled. In such a 
case unnecessary modelling steps can be avoided.  
3.2.6  Automated Approach 
     The main advantage of the novel method is two-way fault propagation modelling, 
which corresponds well to real system behaviour. The method can be used to model 
complex fluid systems that contain flow and control loops, have different and 
reconfigurable behaviour in each phase. Due to the flexibility of the method, i.e., an 
unrestricted number of entries in the table, the size of the models can become large, 
but an automated modelling approach will ease the implementation of the algorithm. 
Some expert knowledge is needed to construct component models. However, once 
models are obtained they can be reused for each type of the component while 
recursively following the straightforward steps of the algorithm. Also, the 
decomposition can be error-prone, therefore, the conversion approach could also be 
implemented on the computer to manage this time-consuming process.   
3.3 Fault Cancellation Strategy 
     The fault propagation modelling technique can be used to confirm or cancel faults 
which are added to a fault condition report during the start-up of the system. If the 
system is operated autonomously and decisions are made according to the fault 
condition report, such faults can cause unnecessary shutdowns of the system.  
     A following fault cancellation rule is described: 
     Using the fault propagation modelling technique deviations that arise from the 
failure listed in the fault condition report are propagated through the system looking 
for further evidence of the failure. If the evidence of the successful operation of the 
component is observed in the later phases of the operation, the failure can be 
cancelled due to the contradiction between symptoms and expected effects. If there 
is no evidence of the successful operation of the component, the failure is confirmed 
and related actions should be taken. For example, in the operation of the 
autonomous aircraft the fault cancellation can occur if the evidence against the faults 
recorded during the start-up is known before the take-off phase. The aircraft can 
progress through all phases up to this point.  If such evidence is not found, the fault 
is confirmed and the future flight might need to be cancelled.  
     The strategy is illustrated using the example system in the following section. 
4. Illustration of the Method 
4.1 Example System Definition 
     Consider an example system represented by the schematic diagram, shown in 
Figure 3. This simple system contains components of the main equipment classes 
and is used to illustrate the fault propagation modelling technique using the 
propagation table method. 
 
Figure 3: A Schematic Diagram of a Simple System 
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The aim of the system is to feed fuel from the wing tank to the engine. The system 
operation is considered in two phases: 
 
 
Phase I:  
     In the start-up phase the engine pump is commanded to start pumping. The 
engine feed valve is closed; therefore, the flow is directed back to the tank via the 
pressure relief valve, which stabilises the pressure and flow during the start-up. The 
flow sensor FS1 monitors the flow back to the tank. The auxiliary transfer pump 
cannot be operated in this phase; the level control loop is inactive. 
Phase II:  
     In the normal operation phase the engine feed valve is commanded to open and 
let the flow to the engine, monitored by FS2. As soon as the level in the wing tank 
drops below the expected level due to the fuel burnt by the engine, a signal is sent to 
a controller which then activates the auxiliary transfer pump and starts taking the fuel 
from the auxiliary tank. In normal conditions there is no flow back to the wing tank. In 
the case of a blockage downstream the engine pump, the pressure relief valve PRV1 
opens and allows the flow back to the wing tank, decreasing the pressure and 
avoiding pipe rupture. Similarly, PRV2 directs the flow back to the auxiliary tank, if 
the flow cannot reach the wing tank. 
Following initial conditions are defined:  
x Before the system operation starts the tank is filled up to a normal level. 
x A constant demand is placed on the engine feed pump.  
x Fuel is present in the lines before the pump is turned on.  
4.2 System Decomposition 
     During the decomposition the schematic diagram in Figure 3 is replaced by the 
corresponding configuration diagram, shown in Figure 4. Each component is 
allocated a rectangle, for example, the wing tank is allocated the identification 
number 7 and the model number is 9, i.e., a tank model in Table 1.       
Table 4: A Tabular Configuration of the Example System 
Location 
no. 
Upstream Downstream 
Component Port Component Port 
1 1 out 2 in 
2 2 out 3 in  
3 3 out1 4 in 
4 4 out 5 in 
5 5 out 1 in 
6 3 out2 6 in 
7 6 out 7 in 
8 7 out  8 in 
9 8 out 9 in 
10 9 out 10 in 
11 10 out1 11 in 
12 11 out 12 in 
13 12 out 7 in 
14 10 out2 13 in 
15 13 out 14 in 
16 14 out 15 in 
17 7 level 16 in 
18 16 out 17 in 
19 17 control 2 control 
20 18 control 9 control 
21 19 control 13 control  
22 20 control 15 control 
A tabular form of the system diagram is shown in Table 4, for example, at 
location 3 the upstream component is the divider, which is connected to location 3 
via the port out1, and the downstream component is pressure relief valve PRV2, 
which is connected to it via the port in. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: A Configuration Diagram of the Example System 
1.1 Propagation Tables  
     The propagation tables for the main types of components in fluid systems are 
given in this section.  
Table 5: A Propagation Table for a Level Controller 
No Inputs Component state Outputs Level
 
Control signal 
1 L  W Ystart (Nshut) 
2 1 W Nstart (Yshut) 
3 - CFH Nstart (Yshut) 
4 - CFL Ystart (Nshut) 
5 - Inactive Nstart (Yshut) 
Table 6: A Propagation Table for a Level Sensor 
No Component state Outputs Level
 
1 W Level 
2 SFH H 
3 SFL L 
Table 7: A Propagation Table for a Pipe Divider 
No 
In Cond 
Down 
out1 
Cond 
Down 
out2 
Outputs 
M Pin Fin Min Pout1 Fout1 Mout1 Pout2 Fout2 Mout2 
Pipe4 
6        5 
Wing 
Tank 
7        9 
Pipe1 
8       5 
Pump 
9       7 
Pipe 
Divider 
10      6 
Valve 
13    10 
Pipe3 
14      5 
Engine 
15      1 
7 8 9 10 
14 15 
Valve 
Control 
19    11 
Pump 
Control 
18      8 
21 
Pipe2 
12      5 
PRV1 
11    10 
Level 
Sensor 
16      4 
Level 
Control 
17      3 
Pipe 
Divider 
3        6 
Aux 
Pump 
2        7 
Aux 
Tank 
1        9 
1 
PRV2 
4      10 
Pipe5 
5        5 
2 6 
3 
4 5 
17 
18 
19 
11 
12 13 
16 
20 
Engine 
Control 
20      2 
22 
1 Y B B 3 Z Y 3 Z N 3 Z N 
2 Y B/O R 3 ) Y 3 Z N 3 ) Y 
3 Y B O P F Y P Z N P F Y 
4 Y R B/O 3 ) Y 3 ) Y 3 Z N 
5 Y R R 3 ) Y 3 ) Y 3 F Y 
6 Y O  B  P  F  Y  P  F  Y  P  Z  N  
7 Y O  O  P  F  Y  P ) Y  P ) Y 
8 N - - 3 Z  N  3 Z  N  3 Z  N  
Table 8: A Propagation Table for a Pump 
No 
Inputs Component 
State 
Conditions 
Downstream 
Outputs 
M Control Signal Pin Fin Min Pout Fout Mout 
1 Y Ystart (Nshut) W/ON W P1 F Y P2 F Y 
2 Y - F/ON W P1 F Y P2 F Y 
3 Y Nstart (Yshut) W/OFF - 3 Z N 3 Z N 
4 Y - F/OFF - 3 Z N 3 Z N 
5 Y Ystart (Nshut) W/ON B P1 F Y 3 Z Y 
6 Y - F/ON B P1 F Y 3 Z Y 
7 Y Ystart (Nshut)  W/ON R P1 F Y 3 F Y 
8 Y - F/ON R P1 F Y 3 F Y 
9 N - - - 3 Z N 3 Z N 
Table 9: A Propagation Table for a Tank 
No Inputs Component State 
Conditions 
Downstream 
Outputs 
M Level Pout Fout Mout Floss 
1 Y N W W P F Y Z  
2 Y L W W 3 ) Y Z  
3 Y - W B 3Z Y Z  
4 Y - W R 3 ) Y Z 
5 Y - B - 3 Z N Z 
6 Y - R - 3 Z N H 
7 Y - L W P ) Y L  
8 Y - L B P Z Y L  
9 Y - L R 3 ) Y L  
10 N - - - 3 Z N Z 
Table 10: A Propagation Table for a Valve 
No 
Inputs Comp 
State 
Cond 
Down 
Outputs 
M Control Signal Pin Fin Min Pout Fout Mout 
1 Y Yopen (Nclose) W/O W P1 F Y P2 F Y 
2 Y - F/O W P1 F Y P2 F Y 
3 Y Nopen (Yclose) W/C - 3 Z  Y 3 Z  N 
4 Y - F/C - 3 Z  Y 3 Z  N 
5 Y Yopen (Nclose) W/O B 3 Z  Y 3 Z  Y 
6 Y -  F/O B 3 Z Y 3 Z Y 
7 Y Yopen (Nclose) W/O R 3 ) Y 3 ) Y 
8 Y -  F/O R 3 ) Y 3 ) Y 
9 N - - - 3 Z N 3 Z N 
1.2 Fault Propagation Modelling Algorithm  
1.2.1 Formalisation of the System Operation 
     Table 11 shows what component states are expected in each phase during the 
normal behaviour of the system.  
  
 
Table 11: Expected Working States for System Components 
Comp 
id 
Phase I Phase II Reconf 
PRV1 
Reconf 
PRV2 
1 W W - - 
2 W/OFF W/ON - - 
3 - - - - 
4 W/C W/C - W/O 
5 W W - W 
6 W  W  - - 
7 W  W   - - 
8 W W  - - 
9 W/ON W/ON - - 
10 - -  - - 
11 W/O W/C W/O - 
12 W W W - 
13 W/C W/O - - 
14 W W - - 
15 W W - - 
16 W W  - - 
17 Inactive 1start W  - - 
18 :<start (Nshut) :1shut - - 
19 :1open :<open (Nclose) - - 
20 :1on  :<on (Noff)  - 
     Note, that in addition to phase I and II, two reconfiguration options in phase II are 
also described. For example, in order for the reconfiguration PRV1 to occur 
successfully, i.e., the flow is redirected back to the wing tank due to blockages 
downstream the pump, the pressure relief valve PRV1 has to open and the pipe 
downstream has to work. These conditions are modelled if the reconfiguration PRV1 
is present. The rest of the component states in the reconfiguration column are left 
unidentified, since it is impractical to list all possible combinations of component 
states, when the reconfiguration occurs.  
     Control signals are also used in the modelling, as shown in the entries of the 
control components in rows from 17 to 20 in Table 11. For example, in phase I the 
engine pump controller, component 18, is expected to be in the working state and 
send the signal to start the pump, i.e., Ystart. Flow and control loops are also 
identified. For example, the flow line back to the auxiliary tank through PRV2 forms a 
flow loop, i.e., 1-2-3-4-5-1, and the tank level control loop is represented by 17-18-
19.  
4.2.1 Modelling Algorithm 
4.2.1.1 Start of the Modelling Process  
     The operation starts in phase I when the engine pump starts and the engine valve 
is closed. The set location for the modelling of the example system is the wing tank. 
According to the control signals in Table 11 in phase I the engine feed pump starts 
taking the fuel from the wing tank. The tank model (model Table 9±T9) and row 
1(R1) is considered, since in addition to the mass present (the initial assumption), 
the level in the tank is normal, the tank and the system downstream is working. This 
row gives the parameter values at location 8, i.e., at the out port of the tank, P8 = P, 
F8 = F, M8 = Y, Floss = Z.  
     Alternatively, consider a failure scenario. For example, if the fuel feed pump 
failure is considered in phase II, then the fault propagation in phase II starts with the 
failed component model, i.e., the pump model. Since the pump fails off, T7R4 (model 
table 7, row 4) is used to obtain deviations in and out of the pump, i.e., at locations 9 
and 10, P9 3)9 = Z and M9 = N, P10 3)10 = Z and M10 = N. 
4.2.1.2 Propagation Downstream the System 
     During the propagation downstream, the values at the out port location of the 
component become the values at the in port of the component downstream.  
     In the normal operation, according to Table 4 the downstream component of the 
wing tank is pipe 1. Considering T5R1, i.e., mass is present, the pipe is working and 
the conditions downstream are working, gives P9 = P, F9 = F and M9 = Y. The values 
at other locations are obtained in a similar way until the end of the system is 
reached.   
     For the pump failure scenario in phase II, the values at location 10 are passed 
downstream until the end of the system is reached.    
4.2.1.3 Propagation Upstream the System 
     During this step, parameter values at the in port of the component are recorded, 
when the state of the failed component becomes the state of conditions downstream. 
In the normal operation, there are no components upstream the wing tank, since the 
control loop is considered separately. Therefore, the algorithm moves to the step of 
tank calculation.  
     In the pump failure situation, the pipe model for the upstream component pipe 1 is 
considered, and the failure is treated as the absence of the mass. Therefore, T5R9 
gives parameter values at location 8, i.e., 33) =DQG0 17KHSURFHVV
stops because the gap unit, i.e., the tank, is reached.   
4.2.1.4 Tank Level Calculation  
     The tank level is calculated using equation 1, once all the locations downstream 
the tank are visited. In the normal operation, the level is normal, i.e., Level = N + 
Fback - Fout = N, (Fback = Fout). It is also the case for the pump failure scenario in phase 
II, i.e., Level = N + Fin - Fout = N, (Fin = Fout = Z). This value is sent to the control loop 
and the process continues until all the relevant level deviations are considered, as 
shown in Figure 2. The algorithm and the parameter values for the pump failure 
scenario are shown in Table 12. 
Table 12: Pump Failure Propagation in Phase II 
Stage Model Loc Parameter values 
Start of the 
Modelling 
T7R4 
 
9 P9 3)9 = Z, M9 = N 
10 P10 3)10 = Z, M10 = N 
Downstream the 
System 
T6R8 11 P11 3)11 = Z, M11 = N 
14 P14 3)14 = Z, M14 = N 
T10R9 12 P12 3)12 = Z, M12 = N 
T5R9 13 P13 3)13 = Z, M13 = N 
T10R9 15 P15 3)15 = Z, M15 = N 
End of System T5R9 16 P16 3F16 = Z, M16 = N 
Upstream the 
System  
T5R9 8 P8 3)8 = Z, M8 = N 
Tank level 
Calculation 
Tank 
Level 
17 Level17 = N + Fin - Fout = N (Fin = Z, 
Fout = Z) 
Control Loop T4R1 18 Level18 = N 
T3R2 19 Nstart 
Downstream the 
System 
T9R10 1 P1 3)1 = Z, M1 = N, Floss = Z 
T7R9 2 P2 3)2 = Z, M2 = N 
T6R8 3 P3 3)3 = Z, M3 = N 
6 P6 3)6 = Z, M6 = N 
T10R9 4 P4 3)4 = Z, M4 = N 
T5R9 5 P5 3, F5 = Z, M5 = N 
T5R9 7 P7 3)7 = Z, M7 = N 
Tank Level 
Calculation 
Tank 
Level 
17 Level17 = N  
4.3 Fault Cancellation Example  
     The fault cancellation strategy is illustrated using an example of transient 
behaviour during the start-up of the fuel pump. If the pump failure appears in the fault 
condition report, the system might experience unnecessary shutdown. Assume the 
following readings of the two flow sensors in phase I and II, shown in Table 13: 
Table 13: Sensor Readings 
Phase FS1 FS2 
I F13 = Z F16 = Z 
II F13 = Z F16 = N 
According to the readings in phase I, no flow at location 13 is an unexpected 
measurement, since in phase I the flow is directed back to the wing tank, i.e., via 
location 13. Therefore, a list of potential failures that could have caused this 
deviation is produced, for example, P2B, PRV1B, PumpF/OFF, etc. This list can be 
obtained using some diagnostics technique. Assume that the pump failure is 
recorded in the fault condition report. According to the fault cancellation rules further 
evidence of this failure is needed to confirm the fault. The deviations in system 
variables due to this failure are propagated through the system using the propagation 
tables, as seen in Table 12. The pressure drops and there is no flow and no mass in 
the system.  
If the pump is failed, as concluded from the FS1 reading in phase I, in phase II 
there should be no flow at location 16, i.e., no flow to the engine, F16 = Z. This value 
contradicts the FS2 reading in phase II, i.e., F16 = N. Due to this evidence it can be 
concluded that the no flow reading at location 13 in phase I was not caused by the 
pump failure, and therefore, the pump failure can be cancelled. F13 = Z was caused 
by the transient behaviour of the pump. If there are more faults in the fault condition 
report, they are considered in a similar way.  
5. Fault Diagnostics using the Propagation Table Method 
In addition to the fault cancellation strategy, the propagation table method presented 
in this paper can also be used in fault diagnostics. The main principle of the fault 
diagnostics technique is to map symptoms of possible failure modes in component 
models until all locations in the diagram are visited. Downstream and upstream 
components from the location of the symptom are considered according to the rules 
similar to the fault propagation rules. If a tank level measurement is known, all 
possible combinations of the flow in and out of the tank, that could have caused the 
tank level deviation, are considered and their causes are listed. If multiple 
measurements are known, the most upstream measurement is considered first. Only 
failure modes that satisfy all the measurements are considered in the list of faults. 
Non-minimal combinations are always removed.  
6. Conclusions  
A fault propagation modelling technique has been developed employing a novel 
propagation table method. The methodology takes into account the schematic 
diagram of the system and the description of the system behaviour in each phase. 
The propagation table method accommodates an unlimited number of component 
and system states and allows a two-way modelling process. Component models are 
used to propagate the deviations of process variables through the system until all the 
locations in the diagram are visited. Expected outcomes are compared with 
observed symptoms and can be used to confirm the fault, if the outcome agrees with 
the symptom, or to cancel the fault, if a contradiction is observed. The suitability of 
the method to model complex systems is also discussed.  
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